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I. INTRODUCTION
The most basic features of United States immigration law generate
continuing controversy. Public debate over federal statutory limits on
entry into the United States is ongoing and frequently passionate. The
practical importance of the subject seems undeniable. The lives or wel-
fare of many people are directly implicated. Many legal and political
philosophers, as well as immigration specialists, however, shy away from
some of the most fundamental issues of moral limits on immigration.
A possible explanation for this inattention may be that many stu-
dents of basic immigration policy half-consciously perceive that broad
legal restrictions on entry into the United States cannot be morally justi-
fied. These persons also assume that opening legal entry into the United
States would require current United States residents to endure a painful
sacrifice of important interests and privileges. Admittedly, academic
calls for collective self-sacrifice are not unknown. In the immigration
context, however, the direct beneficiaries of an open entry policy do not
currently vote or maintain an organized presence in the United States.
Calls for an open entry policy are therefore understandably not particu-
larly common.
This Article seeks to broaden the debate not only by arguing for an
open entry policy, but also, perhaps surprisingly, by arguing that a care-
fully crafted version of an open entry policy need not involve costs to
current citizens so substantial as to practically disqualify such a policy.
It is widely assumed that an open entry policy would simply result
in "swamping the lifeboat"; that is, in the abrogation of national sover-
eignty,' in enormous costs in unemployment,2 in reduced wage rates and
other economic and welfare costs,' in jeopardizing our national cultural
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1. See infra part II.B.
2. See infra part II.D.
3. See infra part II.D.
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identity,4 and in slowing or reversing progressive political and social
change.' Each of these obvious concerns requires a different response,
and each is addressed separately below.
The defense of an open entry policy is thus multifaceted. But it may
be of general interest to think about the possibility of "decoupling" an
open entry policy from various more or less related areas of government
policy, including minimum wage rates, benefits eligibility, and voting
rights.6 Once this decoupling process is undertaken, it becomes clear
that various costs of open entry can be minimized or redistributed in
ways that enhance the appeal of an open entry policy. 7
This Article concludes by examining the moral arbitrariness of re-
strictions on immigration and by constructing a broad-based affirmative
moral case for open entry." It is hoped that over time, the public debate
over limitations on immigration can be broadened, deepened, and other-
wise enhanced.
II. THE FEARED CONSEQUENCES OF OPEN ENTRY
A. Preliminary Observations
Recent debate over United States immigration law has raised impor-
tant issues of public policy.9 There should, however, be no illusions as to
the remarkably narrow scope of the debate. Current United States immi-
gration policy may seem generous, relative to that of many other na-
tions. 10 But this should not obscure the fact that the mainstream,
contemporary immigration debate focuses only upon various substan-
tially restrictive immigration policies. What might reasonably be re-
ferred to-with sensible qualifications-as an open entry policy of any
sort is not typically considered a viable option."
4. See infra part II.C.
5. See infra part II.C.
6. See infra part II.D.
7. See infra part II.D.
8. See infra part III.
9. Michael Ross, Simpson Seeks 5-Year Cut in Legal Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1994, at A15.
10. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977); James Woodward, Commentary:
Liberalism and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT 59, 63 (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds.,
1992).
11. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Philosophy of Our Immigration Law, 21 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 358, 367 (1956) ("No one, in fact, denies that the policy of unlimited immigra-
tion is obsolete .... "); Judith Lichtenberg, Within the Pale: Aliens, Illegal Aliens, and Equal
Protection, 44 U. PrrT. L. REV. 351, 376 (1983) (discussing "the recognition that unlimited
immigration to the United States would in fact constitute a grave threat to its existence (to its
existence, anyway, in anything like its present form)"); Michael S. Teitelbaum, Right Versus
Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy in the United States, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 21, 55 (1980)
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Given the limitations on judicial decision making, it is not surprising
that the courts do not take an open immigration policy seriously. 2 The
apparent indifference of most major legal and moral philosophers13 is,
however, less justifiable. 14 To the extent that such writers ignore immi-
gration questions, or merely assume the implausibility of any open entry
policy, this indifference should be called into question. This Article
therefore seeks to expand interest in the most basic assumptions underly-
ing the law of immigration, and in the viability of some forms of an open
entry policy.
Substantial legal restriction of immigration is not a clear reflection
of historical tradition in the United States. Currently, of course, entry
into the United States is subject to legal restriction. 15 Alien immigration
was, however, essentially unrestricted at least at the federal level until
1875, 16 with the first general immigration statute following only in
("[I]t is clear that advocacy of unlimited immigration into the United States cannot be taken
seriously in a world in which three billion people are very poor and their numbers increasing
rapidly."); Developments in the Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1286, 1338 (1983) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] ("[V]irtually all experts con-
cede the necessity of setting some limits on immigration .... ").
12. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 695 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The proposition
that the government has a compelling interest in regulating its border hardly needs testimonial
documentation."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); see also Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846,
880 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring apparently without question to "the valid immi-
gration goal of reducing the number of undocumented aliens arriving at our borders").
13. Professor Donald Galloway points out that while Bruce Ackerman has argued for
broad entry rights, writers such as John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Ronald Dworkin have
largely bypassed extended discussion of the justice of particular immigration policies. See
Donald Galloway, Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration, 18 QUEEN'S L.J. 266, 269 n.4
(1993); see also THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 179 (1991) ("[T]he preserva-
tion of a high standard of life depends absolutely on strict controls on immigration."). The
name of Professor Joseph Carens should be added to that of Ackerman as taking seriously
something like an open entry policy. See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, Migration and Morality: A
Liberal Egalitarian Perspective, in FREE MOVEMENT, supra note 10, at 25 ("Thus the pre-
sumption is for free migration and anyone who would defend restrictions faces a heavy burden
of proof."); see also Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free
Movement of People on the Face of the Earth, 81 ETHICS 212, 218 (1971) ("[lIt may well be
discovered that the right to free and open movement of people on the surface of the earth is
fundamental ... in the same sense as is free religion, speech, and the franchise.").
14. Perhaps as a result of the current near consensus against any sort of open entry policy,
the term "open society" in the immigration context has been appropriated to refer not to an
open entry policy, but to a system restricting immigration to roughly current levels, without
bias and with the prospect of rapid transition to citizenship. See Lawrence H. Fuchs, Direc-
tions for U.S. Immigration Policy: Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. PITT. L.
REV. 433, 438 (1983).
15. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (discussing basic statutory
restriction).
16. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761 (1972). Professor Gerald Neuman has ar-
gued that significant restraints on immigration existed, especially state-imposed restrictions,
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1882.17 Legal restrictions on the total annual amount of immigration
into the United States were not imposed until 1921.18
Plainly, matters such as United States population density, interna-
tional wage differentials, government benefit programs, and the demand
for unskilled labor do not now stand as they did during our first century.
Each of these considerations bears legitimately upon United States immi-
gration law and policy. It would therefore be absurd to argue that since
an open entry policy was once viable, it must remain viable today.
Still, the historical fact of roughly a century of open entry into the
United States has some force against certain kinds of cultural, as opposed
to economic, arguments against an open entry policy. Both cultural 9
and economic20 concerns are examined below. For the moment, it suf-
fices to observe that in light of our first century of open entry, any argu-
ment that the United States ethos or the United States community
requires rigorous cultural restrictiveness in immigration is implausible.2 1
Whether the United States ethos in fact requires, or at least suggests,
abolishing such restrictiveness is taken up below. 22
For some time now, admittedly, federal immigration law has im-
posed substantial restrictions on immigration. 23 Since 1990 specified an-
nual ceilings or maxima are imposed on most important categories of
immigrants.24 Although statutory provision is made for the granting of
prior to this date. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
17. An Act to Regulate Immigration, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882); see Kleindienst, 408
U.S. at 761.
18. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 358. Generally, passports were not legally required until 1952.
See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 121 (1958), overruled on other grounds by Califano v.Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978). For a concise discussion of the major subsequent statutory
developments affecting immigration, see Joan A. Pisarchik, Note, A Rawlsian Analysis of the
Immigration Act of 1990, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 721, 732-44 (1992).
19. See infra part II.C.
20. See infra part II.D.
21. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
86 (1984) (describing early U.S. conception of community as "one embracing all who wished
to come and remain here").
22. See infra part II.C.
23. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1510 (11th Cir.) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1988), authorizing President to suspend alien entry into United States when
President determines it would be detrimental to national interest), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245
(1992). For a brief discussion of some of the traditional statutory grounds for exclusion, see,
for example, Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PER-
SONS BETWEEN STATES 124-28 (1978).
24. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)-(e) (Supp. IV 1993) (imposing annual limits respectively
on family-sponsored, employment-based, and diversity immigrants). For a brief overview, see,
for example, AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMEN-
TALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 2-1 to -3 (1992).
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asylum to a class of refugees, granting such asylum remains within the
discretion of the Attorney General.25 More broadly, persons deemed il-
legally present, border arrivals temporarily paroled into the United
States, and would-be entrants interdicted on the high seas are subject to
deportation or exclusion on the basis of correspondingly minimal hearing
rights.26
In general, the substantive legal rights of even the most desperate
individuals seeking initial entry into the United States have been thought
to be modest. The Supreme Court has thus observed, in apparently
anachronistic2" language, that "an alien seeking initial admission to the
United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regard-
ing his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign
prerogative."28 Indeed, this judicial position is frequently encountered.29
It has even been suggested that "Congress can bar aliens from entering
the United States for discriminatory and arbitrary reasons, even those
that might be condemned as a denial of equal protection or due process if
used for purposes other than immigration policy."30
Taken literally, this doctrine would validate, for example, an entry
scheme based on the willingness of potential entrants to undergo severe
and prolonged physical torture. It is, therefore, not surprising that some
25. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 (1992); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 423 (1987).
26. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); see also Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1982) (differentiating between deportation and exclusion hear-
ings); Haitian Refugee Ctr., 953 F.2d at 1506 (concluding that "no right to judicial review
exists for aliens who have not presented themselves at the borders of this country").
27. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
28. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.
29. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 804 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to
U.S. government argument that "aliens have no constitutional right to immigrate to the
United States"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) ("It is clear that Mandel
personally, as an unadmitted and nonresident alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this
country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise."); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950)
("[A]n alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so under any claim of right.");
Marczak v. Greene, 971 F.2d 510, 513 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that Congress's authority over
immigration is "exceptionally broad"); Haitian Refugee Ctr., 953 F.2d at 1507 (discussing
"Congress's intent to preclude judicial review of administrative determinations concerning
aliens"); Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647 n.3 (Ist Cir. 1990) ("It is, of course, beyond
peradventure that Gerry Adams, an unadmitted and non-resident alien, has no right, constitu-
tional or otherwise, to enter the United States."); Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800
F.2d 970, 970-71 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that Congress's power over aliens is "virtually com-
plete" and decisions concerning admissions of aliens are not subject to review). For a general
discussion, see Richard F. Hahn, Comment, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude
Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 957 (1982).
30. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1442 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219
(1984).
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writers have expressed sympathy for the idea of constitutional restric-
tions on immigration criteria and procedures." Regardless, this Article
will show the sheer feasibility and moral attractiveness of some forms of
open entry policy, without launching prematurely into a debate as to the
constitutional status of such a policy.
B. Open Entry and National Sovereignty
What sort of open entry policy, then, could be thought feasible and
morally attractive? Assuming the continued existence of nation-states,
legitimate military defense must be distinguished from unjust foreign in-
vasion. As one writer has observed, "It would be something of a joke to
refer to... defensive military action as 'immigration restriction.' "32 It is
• 31. See, eg., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY 177-222
(1987); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENTARY 9, 17 (1990); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A
Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 886 (1987) [hereinafter
Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion] ("The power of the United States to control immi-
gration, whatever the source of that power, is subject to the Constitution .... "); Louis Henkin,
The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11 (1985); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden
Door, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 965, 979; see also Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1625 (1992) (contrasting immigration law with increasing constitutional protections for
aliens in other areas of law); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547
(1990) (discussing critics' concerns over lack of constitutional judicial review of immigration
law).
Of course, even in the absence of constitutional restrictions on immigration policy, Con-
gress may by statute mandate adherence to certain basic principles ofjustice. See, e.g., Allende
v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1121 & n.18 (1st Cir. 1988) (discussing statutory prohibition of
excluding aliens based upon beliefs, speech, or associations).
Finally, current principles of international law offer little of broad and direct use in open-
ing borders. See, e.g., American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756,
771 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("[E]ven assuming that temporary refuge does qualify as a principle of
customary international law, it will not be applied in a domestic court if Congress is found to
have specifically rejected the asserted norm."); Ann Dummett, The Transnational Migration of
People Seen from Within a Natural Law Tradition, in FREE MOVEMENT, supra note 10, at
169, 171; David C. Hendrickson, Migration in Law and Ethics: A Realist Perspective, in FREE
MOVEMENT, supra note 10, at 213, 218 ("In the traditional understanding of international
law, a state need not invoke its vital interests to justify the exclusion of strangers."); cf Daniel
C. Turack, Freedom of Transnational Movement: The Helsinki Accord and Beyond, 11 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 586 & n.4 (1978) (noting that Helsinki Accord is not legally binding).
For the leading English case, which starkly limited the ability of would-be immigrants to liti-
gate denial of entry, see Chun Teeong Toy v. Musgrove, 1891 App. Cas. 272 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Supreme Court of Victoria).
32. James L. Hudson, The Ethics of Immigration Restriction, 10 Soc. THEORY & PRAC,
201, 227 (1984); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) (discussing power to
exclude aliens for sake of "defending the country against foreign encroachments and dan-
gers"); Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that "policy toward aliens is
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possible, of course, to refer to any substantial influx of entrants as an
"invasion," but such concerns seem to raise the sorts of cultural or com-
munitarian concerns that are addressed below,33 rather than military se-
curity in a narrow sense.34
Admittedly, there may be intermediate cases in which, for example,
a country seeks to export its prison or mental hospitalization costs by
forcing, persuading, or merely allowing massive numbers of these unde-
sired residents to emigrate to a particular recipient state. The best guide
in such cases will be our sense of whether, as in the classic immigrant
case, the decision to enter was made exclusively by each would-be en-
trant, even if under the press of circumstance, or whether the entry is
ultimately traceable to a donor-government policy of seeking to exter-
nalize perceived costs by encouraging emigration. Whether a foreign
government is seeking on a major scale to manipulate a generous United
States entry policy should not, in practice, be unusually difficult to deter-
mine. A genuine open entry policy, then, need not invite foreign
exploitation.
This argument can be expanded, though, by considering whether an
open entry policy is in all contexts consistent with the idea of national
sovereignty. Courts have frequently held that the power to limit immi-
gration, or to deny entry, is a necessary, inherent aspect of national sov-
ereignty.35 With this doctrine I take no issue. It is important, however,
vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of
... the war power ...." (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)
(footnote omitted))), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980); Developments in the Law, supra note
11, at 1315 ("Governmental power to regulate admission... [is] necessary... to protect the
country from foreign encroachments and dangers.").
33. See infra part II.C.
34. The problem of a foreign government's conscious decision to send large numbers of its
own citizens is raised hypothetically in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 975 (11th Cir. 1984),
affid, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). For a less hypothetical Cuban example, see John A. Scanlan &
O.T. Kent, The Force of Moral Arguments for a Just Immigration Policy in a Hobbesian Uni-
verse, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? 61, 70 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988). For a recog-
nition that military security is not incompatible with a degree of openness, see Pericles's
Funeral Oration:
If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our antagonists. We
throw open our city to the world, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners from any
opportunity of learning or observing, although the eyes of an enemy may occasion-
ally profit by our liberality; we trust less in system and policy than in the native spirit
of our citizens ....
THUCYDIDEs, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 109 (T.E. Wick trans., 1982).
35. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Jean, 727 F.2d at 964 ("For centu-
ries, it has been an accepted maxim of international law that the power to control the admis-
sion of foreigners is an inherent attribute of national sovereignty." (citing Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-11 (1893))); Sanchez v. Kindt, 752 F. Supp. 1419, 1422 (S.D.
Ind. 1990); see also Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 853-54 (tracing
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to recognize how little this doctrine, by itself, actually says. It should be
clear that the mere possession of a power, in this case of limiting entry,
does not require the actual exercise of that power in practice.
Thus, we might equally grant that the fully sovereign government of
a territory necessarily must possess the authority to inflict legal punish-
ments, including the death penalty. It would hardly follow, however,
that a state is no longer sovereign if, perhaps by statute or by constitu-
tional amendment, it consistently declines to impose, or constitutionally
disables itself from imposing, the death penalty.
Similarly, a government could remain sovereign if it freely and con-
scientiously chose a policy of open entry, even if such a border policy was
written into its constitution. Such a policy could represent an authorita-
tive, deliberate act of self-definition and self-determination by the public
in its sovereign capacity. Such a choice seems at the very least as com-
patible with genuine national sovereignty as the current United States
policy of nominally asserting complete legal border control while in prac-
tice exerting only minimal control over the entry and departure of un-
documented persons. 6
Thus, the idea of sovereignty itself does not require any particular
degree of actual openness or closure of borders, any more than sover-
eignty itself requires, for example, any particular approach to population
policy. A community may, in its sovereign capacity, choose to extend its
scope to encompass a broadly defined or even partially self-selected class
of current outsiders.37 A broad, or in some respects open-ended, com-
munity self-definition need not amount to an abrogation of community
sovereignty. It should thus be clear that the relevant fear is not that open
entry jeopardizes national sovereignty, but that open entry may threaten
community self-preservation as a defined, distinctive culture.38
doctrine in U.S. law to Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581 (1889)); David A. Martin, Book Review, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 987, 987 (1990) (review-
ing OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?, supra note 34) (referring to "widely held view"
that "the admission and exclusion of aliens are the discretionary prerogative of sovereign
nations").
36. See Tom Morganthau, America: Still a Melting Pot?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 1993, at
16, 20 (citing Lawrence H. Fuchs, Acting Chair of U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform,
for estimate of as high as 500,000 undocumented alien entrants annually).
37. But cf Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982) (holding that aliens are
outside scope of community political self-definition process). On a related analogy, current
members of the community are thought of as property owners, who on that basis may or may
not choose to extend or partially transfer those rights, voluntarily, to current outsiders. This
analogy is referred to in Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255, 269.
38. For references to a linkage between restrictions on entry and "self-preservation" in one
sense or another, see, for example, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)
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C. Open Entry and National Cultural Character
I have suggested above that open entry need not countenance ma-
nipulation or invasion by foreign powers,39 and that open entry is com-
patible with self-determination and self-definition at the national level.'
Instead, the real worry seems to be that open entry may lead to a failure
to preserve the nation's basic character.41 Open entry might, it is
thought, transform a society culturally beyond recognition in allegedly
undesirable ways.
First, it is believed that open entry, or merely excessive, rapid immi-
gration, might lead to adverse changes in the receiving country's political
culture.42 Assume for the purposes of this discussion that the receiving
country's political culture is, to some sufficient degree, genuinely or ob-
jectively good. Without this assumption, mere political self-preservation
would carry little moral weight. Even on this assumption it is difficult to
see why current residents have some sort of absolute right against ad-
verse political-cultural changes not stemming from foreign invasion or
manipulation. Convincing arguments must be made why protecting
against adverse political-cultural changes is genuinely incompatible with
all forms of open entry policy, and why the harms of such cultural
changes outweigh or outrank all possible rights and interests of all
would-be immigrants who are to be barred. It is not immediately obvi-
ous why person A should be protected from a less attractive political
culture at the cost of starvation, poverty, or repression of person B.
These matters are pursued in general terms below. 43 For the mo-
ment, I merely assert that through what I call decoupling, the United
States might combine an open entry policy with a variety of legal meas-
ures designed to minimize the risk that immigration will slow or reverse
any momentum toward progressive political change within the United
States.4"
and James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM.
J. INT'L L. 804, 804 (1983); see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 51 (1983) for
the argument that "the right to restrain the flow [of immigrants] remains a feature of commu-
nal self-determination."
39. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., ALAN DowTY, CLOSED BORDERS 14 (1987).
42. See Jiirgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Fu-
ture of Europe, 12 PRAXIS INT'L 1, 17 (1992) (discussing Hannah Arendt's analysis, permitting
citizenship only if prospective citizen is willing to "be a member of this particular historical
community"); James W. Nickel, Human Rights and the Rights of Aliens, in THE BORDER
THAT JOINS 42 (Peter G. Brown & Henry Shue eds., 1983); Schuck, supra note 21, at 89.
43. See infra part III.
44. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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A broader challenge to an open entry policy raises the prospect of
adverse cultural, and not merely political-cultural, changes flowing from
allegedly excessive immigration. The desire to limit immigration may
reflect "a concern that cultural change should not proceed so rapidly as
to destabilize United States society." 45 This broader culturally based
challenge is an important one, and cannot be evaded by questioning
whether genuine cultural stability is currently possible for the United
States at any level of immigration, by questioning whether we can clearly
distinguish between cultural stability and instability, or even by demand-
ing to know why our being spared cultural instability should trump the
rights and interests of would-be immigrants.
In some measure, of course, concerns for cultural stability may sim-
ply mask "paranoia, xenophobia, and racism,"" along with unwarranted
national chauvinism. In other cases concern for cultural stability may
depend upon a romantic, unrealistic view of the extent to which the con-
temporary United States constitutes a culturally uniform genuine com-
munity.47 It may be unreasonable to accuse an open entry policy of
undermining a national community if the United States would not re-
motely approach a genuine community at any level of immigration."
45. Gerald L. Neuman, Rhetorical Slavery, Rhetorical Citizenship, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1276, 1288 (1992) (reviewing JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR
INCLUSION (1991)). The classic international law theorist Emmerich de Vattel discusses a
right to refuse entry to, among others, those the nation "has just cause to fear... will corrupt
the manners of the citizens.... will create religious disturbances, or occasion any other disor-
der, contrary to the public safety." 1 EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 108
(Joseph Chitty trans., reprint ed. n.d.). A purported concern for public morals and for an
alleged unassimilable invasion of Chinese immigrants constituting "a menace to our civiliza-
tion" is discussed in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, 594-96 (1889).
46. See Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 859.
47. See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 221-22 (1991) (crit-
icizing Michael Walzer's overestimate of extent to which actual nation-states constitute essen-
tially homogenous cultural communities); Richard C. Sinopoli, Liberal Justice, National
Community, 15 HIST. EUR. IDEAS 519, 524 (1992) (attacking Walzer's failure to differentiate
between states and communities).
48. See, e-g., Aleinikoff, supra note 31, at 30. For further relevant discussion, see David A.
Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Be-
yond, 44 U. PrTT. L. REV. 165, 194-95 (1983), which refers to the scholarly debate over
whether communities should be thought of as purposive or as organic entities, and Andrew
Mason, Liberalism and the Value of Community, 23 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 215 (1993). Mason
refers to the possibility of a community united only by shared geographical location, see id. at
217, while observing that "there does not seem to be a distinctive set of values shared by many
or most British people," id. at 221. Mason also refers to the quite sensible view that commu-
nity, in any rich sense of the term, "is necessarily restricted to small groups." Id. at 224.
These observations suggest the unreasonableness of the view that the United States now consti-
tutes one unified cultural community, but would likely lose this homogeneity after a period of
open entry. For further discussion of the ambiguous notion of community, see SEBASTIAN DE
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It is, however, certainly possible to argue that an open entry policy
would greatly increase the current level of ethnic conflict within the
United States, resulting in greatly enhanced ethnic violence, hostile sepa-
ratism, and cultural polarization. Examples of nation-states torn by such
sectarian division are, unfortunately, not difficult to cite.49 The problem
of cultural conflict sufficient to justify restrictions on entry is addressed
in stages below.
Two preliminary points can be made regarding the issue of whether
cultural conflict justifies restrictions on entry. First, it is apparently diffi-
cult to find an era in United States history in which it could not be so-
berly judged that social or cultural conflict was threatening our sense of
community." Yet, in retrospect, what may have struck us at the time as
the loss of valued solidarity may later seem a neutral or even valuable
cultural development.5 1 Second, and relatedly, given that dubious collec-
tive track record in recognizing unredeemed loss of community, and in
view of the interests of the would-be entrants at stake, application of
something like a demanding "clear and present danger" test may be ap-
propriate if entry is to be restricted based on fear of sufficiently severe
cultural conflicts that would presumably not otherwise occur.5 2
GRAZIA, THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY (1963), ROBERT A. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COM-
MUNITY (1953), and THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY (David W. Minar & Scott Greer eds.,
1969).
49. See, e.g., Teitelbaum, supra note 11, at 43. But cf Habermas, supra note 42, at 7
("[E]xamples of multicultural societies like Switzerland and the United States demonstrate
that a political culture... by no means has to be based on all citizens sharing the same
language or the same ethnic and cultural origins."). For a contemporary argument for the
possible stability of a society featuring many sharp and basic cultural conflicts, see JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
50. See Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of
Social Form, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 163, 164-65 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro
eds., 1993).
51. The classic Hart-Devlin debate shows the difficulty of assessing the actual net social
costs of cultural changes once deemed threatening. Compare PATRICK DEVLIN, THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF MORALS at ix (1965) ("[T]he judgment which the community passes on a
practice which it dislikes must be calm and dispassionate and that mere disapproval is not
enough to justify interference.") with H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 82
(1963) ("There is no evidence that the preservation of a society requires the enforcement of its
morality 'as such.' ").
52. Even the early immigration case of Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893), sounds something of a cautionary note in referring to "evident danger" and "manifest
injury," id. at 707 (quoting 1 DE VATrEL, supra note 45, § 230). For a discussion of the
contemporary "clear and present danger" test in the context of restrictions on freedom of
speech, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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Cultural change is always threatening to a society,53 and has of
course been a constant feature of life in the United States. 4 The consen-
sus, however, is that the cultural changes wrought by immigration have
been generally beneficial 5--at least in retrospect.5 6 It is important to ask
directly, though, whether the United States ethos is genuinely compatible
with an open entry policy.
It is of course impossible to fairly summarize the United States ethos
in general. Certain strands, qualities, and themes, however, can be iden-
tified. Certain currents seem dominant over time. It does not take long,
for example, for Michael Walzer's analogy of the United States to an elite
university, "besieged by applicants, 5s7 to begin to break down. It may be
that for an elite university to avoid compromising its distinct mission, it
must reject an open admissions policy in favor of selectivity. And it is
certainly possible to speak of national aspirations or perfectionism, or of
overridingly important national cultural goals.5 8
But the United States ethos simply does not require analogous at-
tempts, futile or successful, at selectivity among entrants. One way of
explaining this would be to say that the United States ethos is by its
nature not concretely perfectionist; another would be that there is no set
of cultural priorities or substantive goals, held in common, to which im-
migration policy might be accommodated. 9 We could just as well say,
however, that substantive or perfectionist dimensions of the United
States ethos-our highest and best public selves-are compatible with,
and may actually require, an open entry policy.
53. See, eg., PETER MARRIS, LOSS AND CHANGE 7 (1974).
54. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTITUTION 29 (1989).
55. See id. at 269.
56. See, e.g., Nathan Glazer, The Integration of American Immigrants, 21 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 256, 258 (1956).
57. WALZER, supra note 38, at 32.
58. See, e.g., Charles R. Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL.
591, 599-600 (1983).
59. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties". A Re-
sponse to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 240-41 (1983) (debunking existing notion that
there is no unifying United States ideology of culture). This argument need not go so far as to
say that public policy can long afford to be utterly neutral--even if this is possible-among all
competing conceptions of private good or private aims. For the likely instability of any such
attenuated political culture, see WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIR-
TUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991).
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There is certainly no point in denying historic6" and contemporary 61
United States cultural strands opposed to substantial, broad-based immi-
gration. The benefit of hindsight, however, invariably leaves most of us
with a collective sense of embarrassment over such impulses.62 Other
deeper, cultural themes that we tend to be prouder of in moments of
reflection, have long run in the direction of diversity, pluralism, heteroge-
neity, and inclusion. Professor Frederick Whelan has observed that
"[d]iversity in the sense of ethnic and cultural pluralism has always been
an important aspect of the American tradition. ' 63 Immigration has obvi-
ously been a crucial source of that renewing diversity. Professor Whelan
has further recognized that "[a]n ongoing tradition of diverse immigra-
tion is arguably part of the very identity of the democratic community of
the United States." 64
Plainly, the United States has been an immigrant society,65 a multi-
racial and multicultural society,66 and will surely remain so67 regardless
of future immigration policy. Diversity and pluralism are not merely
facts, but basic societal values.68 Although we can hardly predict the
60. The reader is invited to reflect, for example, upon The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. at 581, in itself and as a reflection of popular sentiment. See also Legomsky, supra note
37, at 286 ("Whether for cultural, economic, political, or environmental reasons, various im-
migrant waves have typically received at least mixed, and more commonly hostile, public reac-
tions."); Schuck, supra note 21, at 81 (referring to "the nativist impulses that have always been
an important, albeit often deplorable, element of our national character").
61. See, e g., Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the
United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1993); Scaperlanda, supra
note 31, at 967 n.8 (documenting contemporary opposition to significant levels of non-Euro-
pean immigration); Bruce W. Nelan, Not Quite So Welcome Anymore, TIME, Fall 1993, at 10,
10-11 (reporting strong and apparently increasing public sentiment in favor of strict limits on
(legal) immigration).
62. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
63. Frederick G. Whelan, Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 U. PITr. L. REV. 447,
469 (1983); see KARST, supra note 54, at 183.
64. Frederick G. Whelan, Citizenship and Freedom of Movement: An Open Admission Pol-
icy?, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?, supra note 34, at 3, 30.
65. See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION
3-4 (1991).
66. See, eg., Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:
Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Soci-
ety, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 869 (1993). More broadly, see Onora O'Neill, Ethical Reasoning
and Ideological Pluralism, 98 ETHICS 705, 718 (1988) ("[W]e cannot assume a homogeneous
Sittlichkeit [moral sense] either within or beyond boundaries.").
67. See KARST, supra note 54, at 174.
68. See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT 134
(1985) ("[I]nclusiveness is especially important for a society that prides itself on its openness to
immigrants."); Andrew Cutrofello, Must We Say What "We" Means?: The Politics of
Postmodernism, 19 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 93, 102 (1993) (reviewing three works discussing"possibility of creating communities that recognize and respect diversity"); Glazer, supra note
56, at 265 (describing U.S. culture as "based on difference and heterogeneity"); Hendrickson,
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precise demographic effects of a shift to open entry, it seems reasonable
to suppose that open entry would implicitly enhance cultural diversity in
crucial respects. Nor would we necessarily be optimizing diversity by
significantly restricting entry, even if the formulae for priorities among
entrants were maximally sensitive to any recognized underrepresentation
of various groups within United States society. It is not entirely clear
that even if group A is uncontroversially assumed to be underrepresented
relative to group B, diversity is really better served by admitting twenty
As and no Bs, as opposed to fifty of each. Threshold levels may matter as
much as percentages.
Admittedly, it is possible that just the increase in immigration at-
tributable to an open entry policy may lead to additional cultural con-
flict. Such additional cultural conflict may be thought to somehow
morally outweigh the rights and interests of the additional potential im-
migrants. Increases in immigration, whether enhancing diversity or not,
may well lead to social friction, as in the case of contemporary
Germany.69
There is, however, some reason not to be unduly fearful of such a
prospect. Recall first that the United States political system involves not
merely federalism, but the far more radical-and initially counterintui-
tive-notion that increasing the number and the diversity of Madisonian
"factions" actually tends to discourage the worst, most disruptive polit-
supra note 31, at 223; Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There Politics After
Postmodernism?), 89 MICH. L. REv. 1549, 1571 (1991) (reviewing MARTHA MINOW, MAK-
ING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990)) (referring to celebration of "cultural diversity that makes
each of us partly who we are"); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1507
(1988); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the
First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297, 303 (1988) ("If pluralism celebrates the diversity of
cultures, individualism acclaims instead the diversity of persons."); Kim Lane Scheppele, Fore-
word: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2074 (1989) (referring to works celebrating
diversity as value); Teitelbaum, supra note 11, at 23 ("[M]ost of us look with pride upon the
invigoration and pluralism that immigrants continue to provide."); see also George P.
Fletcher, Update the Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, § 4 (late Sunday edition), at 19 (rec-
ommending revised Pledge of Allegiance referring to "one nation, united in our diversity").
For judicial recognition of the value of diversity, see, for example, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 548 (1990). For the value of diversity in rather a different context, see EDWARD
0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992) and J.M. Thoday, Selection and Genetic Hetero-
geneity, in GENETIC DIVERSrrY AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 89, 90 (J.N. Spuhler ed., 1967). But
cf Herman R. van Gunsteren, Admission to Citizenship, 98 ETHICS 731, 736-37 (1988) (argu-
ing that prospective citizens should "grow into" knowledge of historical community, culture,
and dominant language).
69. See, e.g., Habermas, supra note 42. But cf Timothy King, Immigration from Develop-
ing Countries: Some Philosophical Issues, 93 ETHICS 525, 535 (1983) ("[C]ultural diversity can
make for lively and distinct societies, such as Brazil.").
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ical and cultural outcomes. 7° The rough idea is that the greater the
number and variety of groups, the more difficult it will be for any single
group or coalition to communicate, coordinate, and combine in such a
way as to subvert the broader public interest. Enhancing diversity by
multiplying factions through an open entry policy could thus lead to
long-term social and political stability.
Certainly it would be unrealistic to simply view all immigrants as
themselves constituting a large, organized, unified faction, regardless of
their political rights or lack thereof. As one writer has suggested, "The
class of resident aliens, to begin with, includes enormously variegated
groups in terms of country of origin, reason for emigrating, age, race,
income and so on; they are likely to have more in common with particu-
lar groups of citizens than they are with each other. '71 Nor is it clear
that financially well-off, well-educated, English-speaking, established im-
migrants will have a strict identity of interest with other immigrants
lacking these advantages, even if they are of the same national or ethnic
group. Thus, although an open entry policy might in a limited sense
increase the low-level frictions of factional activity, it might also dampen
the adverse effects of faction overall. In sum, the "absorptive capacity"7 2
of a state for additional, more diverse immigration is partly a function of
whether the political system is designed to operate best in an environ-
ment of many and diverse factions, as ours presumably was.
Other processes may also tend to mitigate social conflict related to
immigration. Whether future immigrants incline toward assimilation or
not,73 they will likely tend-at least for a time-to engage in geographi-
cal and cultural "enclaving," in which new immigrants voluntarily seek
first the community of others with similar backgrounds.7 4 The voluntary
concentration of immigrants of a particular background in a particular
area or areas is presumably, in many respects, in their social and eco-
70. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61-62 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed.,
1937); see also DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 105-06
(1984) (discussing Madison's theory that large republics, like United States, are "immune to
the dangers of faction"); MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 141-42 (1987) (discussing Madison's view that large numbers of factions tend to pro-
tect minority interests). It is unclear whether there is any correlation between ethnic strife and
the number of ethnic groups within a society, at least beyond some low threshold number.
71. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and The-
oretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1447 (1993).
72. See Nafziger, supra note 38, at 847.
73. See Aleinikoff, supra note 31, at 31 n.84 ("We live in post-assimilationist days."); see
also Hing, supra note 66 (discussing flaws in assimilationists' positions regarding immigration).
74. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 32, at 218; Schuck, supra note 21, at 46.
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nomic interest.7" Thus, the inevitable strains of immigration are not felt
on a geographically uniform basis.76 At least initially, such strains and
their costs would fall on or even be naturally reduced or avoided in im-
migrant communities themselves, rather than on areas of the country
with small or nonexistent recent immigrant communities. Whatever its
deficiencies, this voluntary enclaving phenomenon would seem to miti-
gate any broader, society-wide cultural strains of immigration.
Additionally, the degree to which the sheer number of new immi-
grants would promote cultural conflicts should not be overestimated. An
open entry policy is not a compelled entry policy, or even a subsidized
entry policy. The number of persons who would voluntarily leave their
native land to live permanently in the United States under an open entry
policy, independent of any incentives or disincentives available to any
government, including our own, should not be casually assumed to be
enormous.
Without denying the disparities in opportunity available in the
United States and the poorest nations, it remains true that persons "who
are immersed in a particular way of life will find it difficult to reject it, or
to sever their emotional ties with it.' '77 Professor Alan Dowty elaborates
the point in the following common-sense terms:
Most people have no inclination to leave their native soil, no
matter how onerous conditions become. Would-be emigrants
must fight off the ties of family, the comfort of familiar sur-
roundings, the rootedness in one's culture, the security of being
among "one's own," and the power of plain inertia. Con-
versely, being uprooted carries daunting prospects: adjusting to
alien ways, learning a new language, the absence of kith and
kin, the sheer uncertainty of it all.78
75. See Schuck, supra note 21, at 46; see also Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner,
Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action, 98
AM. J. Soc. 1320, 1334-35 (1993) (discussing availability of character-based loans in Miami's
Cuban community, where loans could be enforced through ostracism, and when loans on basis
of reputation would presumably be unobtainable in broader banking system).
76. See FRANK D. BEAN ET AL., OPENING AND CLOSING THE DOORS: EVALUATING
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL 112 (1989).
77. Galloway, supra note 13, at 302.
78. DOWTY, supra note 41, at 223; see also WALZER, supra note 38, at 38 (stating that
most persons are "inclined to stay where they are unless their life is very difficult there"); cf
ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 98 (1970) (referring to conditions of
"the high price or the 'unthinkability' of exit"). Of course, the enclaving phenomenon, along
with the possibility of immigrating as an extended family unit, tends to reduce some of these
costs.
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One implication, of course, is that a merely open but unsubsidized entry
policy may disproportionately benefit persons other than the most chron-
ically poor. To the extent that poverty is associated with traditionalism
or limited exposure to modem technological culture, these persons may
tend to be among those least willing and able to emigrate.7 9
It is plausible to assume that as communication technologies ex-
pand, more people will be made aware of the opportunities afforded by
life in the United States. 0 On the other hand, better communications
may also reinforce any perceptions of the United States as a strange, cul-
turally or spiritually alien, and perhaps occasionally dangerous, place. In
any event, the desire not to enter or remain permanently in the United
States depends not solely upon ignorance, but upon basic values.81
Finally, it is worth briefly mentioning in this context an argument
that is further developed below. The actual level and composition of im-
migration under an open entry policy will likely depend, over time, on a
wide range of practically alterable United States government policies re-
garding matters such as minimum wage rates, industry subsidies, health
and welfare benefits, and various political, civic, and voting rights.8 2
Thus, it is extremely important to decouple the potential effects of an
open entry policy from any particular set of such background policies.
The consequences of an open entry policy may vary widely, depending
upon which background assumptions are chosen. For various reasons,
then, assuming an inevitable "tidal wave" of permanent new immigrants
under any open entry policy is unrealistic.
D. Open Entry, Employment, and Economics
Whatever the importance of broad cultural conflicts, there is clearly
a sense in which narrow economic and employment-related issues are
79. See DowTY, supra note 41, at 158.
80. See Judith Lichtenberg, Mexican Migration and U.S. Policy: A Guide for the Per-
plexed, in THE BORDER THAT JOINS, supra note 42, at 13, 21-22.
81. See, e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just
Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 678 (1981) ("While undocumented Mex-
icans fully appreciate the value of superior wages .... they nonetheless prefer life in Mexico
because it accords in many other ways with what they value on a day-to-day basis."); see also
id. at 691 ("[O]ne study indicates that even if offered permanent status in the United States,
most Mexicans would still rather live in Mexico and temporarily migrate for wage-labor."); id.
at 692 ("Despite years of continual contact, most Mexican migrants remain uninterested in
permanent relocation."). Limited rates of entry into the mainland United States from United
States Commonwealth countries or territories may also reflect the cultural or psychological
costs of entry. Finally, consider the inability or disinclination of some U.S. citizens to move to
areas of greater economic opportunity, despite far lower costs of movement in all respects than
most would-be immigrants would have to incur.
82. See infra part II.D.
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fundamental to evaluating immigration policies. These concerns are
multidimensional. Among the most prominent concerns are fears of job
displacement of native workers by immigrants, 3 fears that increased job
competition with immigrants will significantly reduce United States wage
rates, 4 and a variety of fears to the effect that an open entry policy
would involve enormous net economic costs, at least to current citizens.8 5
As to the first of these concerns, the available evidence of displace-
ment of native workers by new entrants is, perhaps surprisingly, quite
weak. Professor George Borjas has concluded that "modern econo-
metrics cannot detect a single shred of evidence that immigrants have a
sizable adverse impact on the earnings and employment opportunities of
native citizens in the United States."8 6 Viewing matters of employment
as simply a zero-sum competition between immigrants and native U.S.
citizens, or African-American workers in particular, is thus a gross over-
simplification at best. 7
Job competition may, for example, be muted by any willingness of
immigrants to take jobs that would otherwise go unfilled or abolished.88
More positively, immigrants generate economic demand for the employ-
83. The Supreme Court has on several occasions observed that a "'primary purpose in
restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for American workers.'" INS v. National Ctr. for
Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 551, 558 (1991) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467
U.S. 883, 893 (1984)); see also GEORGE J. BORiAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF
IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 81 (1990) ("Some observers assert that immigrants take
jobs away from natives: as immigrants enter the labor market, natives are displaced from their
jobs."); JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 209 (1989)
(arguing that although some displacement must occur, it may be offset by beneficial effects);
Thomas Muller, Economic Effects of Immigration, in CLAMOR AT THE GATES 109, 111 (Na-
than Glazer ed., 1985) ("Under some conditions immigrants are substitutes for domestic work-
ers, while under other circumstances they are complements."); Michael Piore, Can
International Migration Be Controlled?, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
21, 30 (Susan Pozo ed., 1986) ("[A]n immigration process which begins initially as essentially
complementary to the needs and aspirations of U.S. nationals [produces] a second generation
and a growing crop of first generation immigrants who are in competition with American
nationals for stable career jobs."); Teitelbaum, supra note 11, at 37.
84. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. LEMAY, FROM OPEN DOOR TO DUTCH DOOR 6 (1987) (refer-
ring to fear that vast influx of immigrants "will destroy the economy or at least severely de-
press wages and working conditions").
85. See id.; GARRETT HARDIN, STALKING THE WILD TABOO 238 (2d ed. 1978) (un-
restricted immigration as leading to environmental devastation via "ruinous system of the
commons"); Anne Dobson-Mack, Independent Immigrant Selection Criteria and Equality
Rights: Discretion, Discrimination and Due Process, 34 CAHIERS DE DROIT [C. DE D.] 549,
552 n.6 (1993).
86. BORiAS, supra note 83, at 81; see also PAUL R. EHRLICH ET AL., THE GOLDEN DOOR
360 (1981) ("There is... little reason to believe that illegal aliens are taking jobs away from
Americans in significant numbers .... ").
87. See Muller, supra note 83, at 120-21.
88. See id at 112; Piore, supra note 83, at 28-29.
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ment of nonimmigrants, 89 start new businesses that employ other per-
sons,90 and in general enhance long-term capital formation. 91 To the
extent that these benefits occur only in the long run, politicians facing
reelection campaigns in the short term may tend to unduly discount such
benefits when legislating on immigration policy, to the prejudice of the
public interest.92 More generally, the nonvoting status of persons wish-
ing to enter the United States tends to bias immigration policy into mor-
ally undervaluing the interests of would-be entrants.93
Relatedly, there is understandable concern that increased immigra-
tion would significantly drive down wages and working conditions. 94
But for reasons analogous to those referred to above in connection with
issues of job displacement, such effects at best are difficult to document.
Immigration can in fact have positive effects on general wage levels.95
Although the matter is not free from doubt, 96 it has been argued that "a
10-percent increase in the number of immigrants increases the average
African-American wage by about .2 percent." 97 On the other hand, the
same increase in immigration may also have a small adverse effect on the
wages of African-American wage earners who are young,98 and there cer-
tainly can be no guarantee that these wage effects must remain constant
at any level and composition of immigration. It seems clear, though, that
any such adverse effects on wage levels of young African-Americans
could be completely negated or compensated for by other federal tax,
training, job development, or transfer programs, without reducing immi-
gration. 99 Funding for such compensatory programs could draw upon
the fact that reductions in wage rates may generate increased profits, or
89. See, eg., Muller, supra note 83, at 121 (discussing increased demand for teachers in
Los Angeles).
90. See SIMON, supra note 83, at 250.
91. See Muller, supra note 83, at 112.
92. See id.; see also GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF
RULES 81, 93 (1985) (stating that participants in political decision making normally do not
base decisions on sufficiently long time horizon).
93. For background, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 82-87 (1980).
For more specific application, see Hudson, supra note 32, at 209-10 and Developments in the
Law, supra note 11, at 1357.
94. See, eg., Teitelbaum, supra note 11, at 38-39.
95. See BEAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 111.
96. See LEMAY, supra note 84, at 135.
97. BORJAS, supra note 83, at 88 (emphasis added).
98. See id. ("[A] 10-percent increase in the number of immigrants reduces the earnings of
young blacks, a group that is particularly sensitive to changes in economic conditions, by only
.1 percent." (footnote omitted)).
99. For related discussion, see infra note 110 and accompanying text.
June 1994] 1283
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1265
may benefit consumers in the form of lower prices of goods manufac-
tured with such labor. I"°
Finally, whether an open entry policy would have other extremely
harmful economic consequences, on net, is doubtful in the extreme. Such
have hardly been the consequences of immigration'historically. 10 1 And
while it is possible to argue that current or prospective immigrants will
make fewer significant contributions, or will otherwise acquit themselves
less gloriously than past waves of immigrants, this argument itself has
greeted virtually every generation of United States immigrants. 10 2 Any
argument that recent immigrants have adapted poorly or that they will
not, in the aggregate, continue the past pattern of immigrant success
seems premature at best."13 There is no obvious reason why future en-
trants would, for example, be less interested in long-term educational in-
vestments in their own human capital, and in that of their children, than
native-born citizens currently seem to be.1°4
In the meantime new immigrants add to the local, state, and federal
tax bases, and reduce every citizen's share of the cost of public goods,
such as defense, that are to some degree insensitive to population size. 105
Given our enormous current national debt, 1 6 new entrants are in effect
agreeing to help bear the cost of past U.S. consumption, 10 7 the enjoyment
100. See BoUAs, supra note 83; at 222.
101. For an entertaining survey of historical examples, see 1 JEAN BODIN, THE Six BOOKS
OF A COMMONWEALE 62 (Kenneth D. McRae ed., 1962).
102. Paul Douglas, the economist and future U.S. Senator, observed in 1919 that "it is the
custom of each generation to view the immigrants of its day as inferior to the stock that once
came over." BORJAS, supra note 83, at 133.
103. See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 56, at 259 (discussing long-term successful economic ad-
aptation of U.S. immigrant groups); Portes & Sensenbrenner, supra note 75, at 1333 (recount-
ing widely unanticipated success of recent Dominican immigrants in New York City).
104. Admittedly, new entrants earning below-average wages may, despite their complemen-
tarity, decrease the average wage per wage earner. As discussed, however, evidence is lacking
that this perfectly understandable statistical development has dramatic adverse long-term con-
sequences for the society, given the tendency of new entrants' skill levels and wages to rise over
time.
105. See BORJAS, supra note 83, at 161. Note also the Supreme Court's observation in
Plyler v. Doe that "[t]here is no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants impose
any significant burden on the State's economy. To the contrary, the available evidence sug-
gests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing their labor to the local
economy and tax money to the state fisc." 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982). Of course, to the extent
that undocumented aliens underutilize public services solely out of a fear of detection and
deportation, such a disincentive would be absent under an open entry policy. But underutiliza-
tion may also be a matter of age profiles and other demographics. In any event, access of new
entrants to public services can be intentionally increased or decreased through expanding or
contracting statutory eligibility, apart from immigration policy.
106. See, e.g., BENJAMIN FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER REAGAN AND AFTER (1988).
107. See Hudson, supra note 32, at 218-19.
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of which they presumably did not directly share. If the United States is
to "grow" its way out of such indebtedness by effectively competing in an
increasingly international, multilingual, and multicultural economy,108
future immigrants ultimately have an even more significant role in the
process. 10 9
As is true of any policy, open entry involves some costs that would
not be incurred under a more restrictive immigration policy. I have
shown above how, at least in certain cases, job competition may produce
winners and losers.' 10 In such cases, and more generally, sound public
policy may require that the direct and indirect beneficiaries of an open
entry policy fully or partially compensate those who suffer loss from such
a policy. The basic point is simply that the choice need not be between
foregoing an open entry policy or allowing all costs of such a policy to
remain on those who initially bear them. All of these costs can be shifted
by governmental action, through subsidies, taxes, redistributive pro-
grams, or other mechanisms. Fairly judging an open entry policy thus
108. See generally Hing, supra note 66, at 882 (discussing growth of international economic
community).
109. Several additional possible concerns may be of interest to some. Consider in turn the
beliefs that immigrants commit some class of serious crimes in substantially disproportionate
numbers; that immigrants will have disproportionately large numbers of children, such as to
substantially burden the United States economy; and that the international AIDS epidemic
significantly affects the attractiveness of an open entry policy. See, for example, SIMON, supra
note 83, at 104, for brief responses to the first two of these concerns; see also Whelan, supra
note 63, at 467, for an exploration of concerns with both expanding and restricting United
States immigration policy. Additionally, studies have, perhaps surprisingly, documented re-
cent reductions in birth rates and desired family size in developing nations. These reductions
have occurred even in the absence of national economic growth or improved living conditions,
which were previously thought of as prerequisites for such demographic changes. Bryant Ro-
bey et al., The Fertility Decline in Developing Countries, Sci. AM., Dec. 1993, at 60. Finally,
the number of HIV-positive persons among potential immigrants is likely to reflect not only
the financial burdens of immigrating, but the relative cost, accessibility, and efficacy of present
and future AIDS treatments in the United States and elsewhere. See Chad Baruch & Franc
Hangarter, Guess Who's Coming to America: An Analysis of United States HIV-Related Immi-
gration Policies, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 301, 312-13 (1993); Jason W. Konvicka, Note, Give Us
Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses... Except When They Have HIV, 27 U. RicH.
L. REv. 531 (1993); see also Juan P. Osuna, The Exclusion from the United States of Aliens
Infected with the AIDS Virus: Recent Developments and Prospects for the Future, 16 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1993) (examining future of exclusion policy).
More generally, it seems implausible that persons physically and financially able to mi-
grate to the United States will also be so ill or infirm as to burden the public health care system
disproportionately, regardless of what level of care is provided for new entrants as a matter of
statutory eligibility.
110. Schuck, supra note 21, at 37-38; see supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. Not
surprisingly, localities bearing what they perceive as disproportionate net costs of immigration
may seek federal reimbursement or federal subsidy of all or part of such costs. See Muller,
supra note 83, at 126-27.
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requires the critic of open entry to consider the morally attractive, feasi-
ble mechanisms by which costs of open entry may be shifted.
Even more broadly, an assessment of an open entry policy requires
breaking any arbitrary or contingent linkage between immigration policy
and any other government policy. The right to enter the country must be
conceptually decoupled from other areas of law and policy. By way of
analogy, consider arguments in favor of capital punishment that empha-
size, for example, the relatively short sentences served by some murder-
ers, the possibility of the subsequent murder of prison guards, or the
failure of prison inmates to contribute to their own maintenance, or to
make even symbolic restitution to the families of their victims.
But to reasonably evaluate capital punishment, a critic must, among
other things, consider feasible alternative correctional worlds without
capital punishment, but in which murderers serve genuine life terms, are
physically isolated from prison guards, and to the extent possible, make
such restitution from their own labor.
Similarly, it is important to evaluate open entry policies in the con-
text of alternative feasible sets of any related background policies that
may dramatically affect the attractiveness of an open entry policy.III
Fundamental principles of economics suggest, for example, that the
number of entrants may be alterable by modifications in the broad system
of benefits awaiting new entrants."12
If the general public, for example, is unwilling to tolerate the level of
immigration attributable to the attraction of particular levels of welfare
or other benefits for new entrants,I 3 the public may respond either by
limiting immigration, or to some limited degree, by reducing welfare or
other benefit levels available to future entrants." 4 If it wishes to, the
public could minimize other perceived costs of open entry by, for exam-
111. For a discussion of the dependence of immigration policy on a number of background
variables, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 323 (1993).
112. See SUSAN GONZALEZ BAKER, THE CAUTIOUS WELCOME: THE LEGALIZATION
PROGRAMS OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT 194 (1990).
113. See BoPiAS, supra note 83, at 150-51; Ronald A. Cordero, Law, Morality, and La
Reconquista, 4 PUB. Ars. Q. 347, 355 (1990); Robert E. Goodin, If People Were Money, in
FREE MOVEMENT, supra note 10, at 6, 11 ("A particularly generous welfare state will always
be at risk of being swamped with immigrants, so long as it allows people to move in freely from
abroad."); Hudson, supra note 32, at 222 ("[TI]he welfare state is incompatible with un-
restricted immigration .... ").
114. In practice, the relative importance of immigration "pull" factors such as jobs, higher
wages, better educational opportunities, or welfare benefits compared to "push" factors in the
potential immigrant's own native country may be difficult to sort out. See SIMON KUZNETS,
TOWARD A THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 41-43 (1968). And of course, I am merely
stipulating that some potential entrants would stay home but for the United States welfare
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ple, enforcing higher or lower minimum wage rates-generally or in par-
ticular industries.
There is, admittedly, no guarantee that the public will be willing to
accept open entry on the basis of a package of rights and benefits for
future entrants that is even minimally consistent with the demands of
justice or the equal protection rights of future entrants. The public
should at least be able to grasp the utter foolishness of denying benefits,
such as vaccinations and other forms of health care, and education, when
providing such benefits would have important positive externalities. At
least emergency provision of basic life necessities may be politically
feasible.
Whether the public could insist, to any degree, on reducing benefits
available to future entrants while still acting justly toward those en-
trants-and not unconstitutionally conditioning their entry-is of course
controversial. 15 Such a course hardly seems morally attractive. Under
the United States Constitution, it is generally impermissible to favor es-
tablished state residents over new entrants to a state.116 Still, it seems
irresponsible to ignore the possibility that insisting on equal benefit rights
for future new entrants may mean, as a matter of practical politics, that
no open entry policy can be enacted. Realistically, the only viable choice
may be between open entry with a minimally reduced benefits package
for future new entrants only, and a more restrictive immigration policy.
Faced with this choice, the case for open entry is surprisingly
strong. For example, consider the choices based on fair and equal con-
sideration of "the interests of all those affected, either directly or indi-
rectly, whether as an immediate result of the policy, or in the long
run."' 117 The enhanced or preserved benefit levels available to those
lucky enough to gain entry in the future must somehow be considered in
the context of the assumed public refusal to grant entry to some number
system; the number of such persons in actuality could conceivably be small for various cultural
reasons.
115. See, e.g., Nickel, supra note 42, at 37 (arguing that human rights transcend alienage or
citizenship status); Peter L. Reich, Jurisprudential Tradition and Undocumented Alien Entitle-
ments, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1992); Peter L. Reich, Public Benefits for Undocumented
Aliens: State Law into the Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REV. 219 (1991). Also of note in
this context are several statements by Cardinal Roger M. Mahony. See, e.g., Larry B. Stam-
mer, Mahony Blasts Political Stance on Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1993, at Bl.
116. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969) (discussing violation of Equal
Protection Clause in apportioning benefits on basis of length of residency or past tax contribu-
tions); see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (holding that Alaska's distribution of oil
revenue, based on length of residence or past contributions to state, unconstitutional under
Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
117. Peter Singer & Renata Singer, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, in OPEN BORDERS?
CLOSED SocIETIEs?, supra note 34, at 111, 121.
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of future would-be entrants. It is hardly implausible that denying entry
works a more substantial hardship than allowing entry, but only at re-
duced government benefit levels.
Insisting upon full benefits for future new entrants, even if this inevi-
tably means denying entry to many others, actually has a lottery-like
quality. Such a policy promotes extreme disparities in well-being. In-
dependent of anyone's efforts or deserts, there arises a favored or "jack-
pot" class of persons who both enter and find relatively great benefit
programs available, and a large "loser" class of persons who are denied
entry and, of course, those high benefit levels. Such a system seems not
so much liberal or generous as morally arbitrary."' When we then add
in any obligations we may have to ensure that the United States remains
a place of great economic opportunity for future generations of natives
and immigrants alike, 119 the case for paying large benefits to future new
immigrants-if at the inevitable expense of restricting immigration and
the jeopardy of future generations-seems even more dubious. There
seems no clear reason, in particular, to favor new immigrants at the ex-
pense of persons who will consider the possibility of immigrating over the
next several generations.
This, however, is not the end of any moral complications. It may be
either practically necessary or morally desirable to take the further step
of decoupling open entry even from voting rights for future first genera-
tion immigrants, at least for a time, at any level of government. Doubt-
less it is at least initially appealing to require that "every new immigrant
... be offered the opportunities of citizenship."' 120 But the general popu-
lace may become convinced that new entrants may, through voting, un-
dermine general liberal democratic goals,' 2 ' or liberal democracy
itself.'22 More pointedly, subordinated or oppressed groups within the
United States may fear that enfranchisement of many new immigrants
from illiberal cultures may retard or reverse contemporary progressive
118. It is, by way of analogy, occasionally alleged that certain aspects of the tort system
result in overcompensating a few plaintiffs while leaving others undercompensated, or not
compensated at all. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTrERY (1979).
119. See, eg., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD 251 (1980)
("[I]ndividuals may be asked to live poorly for the sake of the comfort and development of
future generations ...."). For additional and sometimes dissenting views in this general area,
see, for example, RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
(E. Partridge ed., 1981), Martin Golding, Obligations to Future Generations, 56 THE MONIST
85 (1972), and Peter Laslett, The Conversation Between the Generations, in PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 36 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin eds., 5th ed. 1979).
120. WALZER, supra note 38, at 62.
121. See Nickel, supra note 42, at 39.
122. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 93-95 (1980).
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political trends. The point of such franchise restrictions, of course, is not
to facilitate oppression of new entrants, 123 but to protect fragile and de-
veloping recognition of the rights of current minority citizens.
At a minimum potential entrants are entitled, prior to entry, to a
reasonably clear and reliable description of the relevant limitations, if
any, to be imposed on their franchise and other civic rights. Such disclo-
sure would at least allow potential entrants to make an informed choice
as to entry, without clearly denying their constitutional rights upon en-
try.124 Presumably, any necessary franchise restrictions may deter at
least a few potential entrants, while being understandably viewed by
others as a small price to pay.
III. OPEN ENTRY AND OBLIGATIONS TO NEIGHBORS AND
STRANGERS
To show that an open entry policy is feasible is not, admittedly, to
show that it is morally or constitutionally sound. It has been argued that
"it is in its immigration laws that a state most starkly asserts the primacy
of state interest over universal principles of justice." '125 Few states, how-
ever, would concede the injustice of their failure to adopt an open entry
policy. One obvious line of defense would be for states to argue that just
as persons owe stronger moral obligations to their own family members
than to strangers, so states bear stronger moral obligations to their own
citizens or current residents than to foreigners.1 26
123. See Teitelbaum, supra note 11, at 58; cf. Etienne Balibar, Propositions on Citizenship,
98 ErHics 723, 728 (1988) (discussing "French character" supremacist movements). Again,
the real choice may be between new entrants with no voting rights, and far fewer entrants.
The worth of their rights to vote in the nation from which persons wish, but are unable, to
emigrate, may be limited. Similarly, any right to vote in the United States that a would-be
entrant could exercise, but for being denied entry into the United States, may also be of limited
value.
124. The Supreme Court has dismissed for want of a substantial federal question the appeal
of a decision by the Colorado Supreme Court that the denial of the franchise to resident aliens
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Skafte v. Rorex, 533 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976),
appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 961 (1977). For a range of academic views on the merits, see Ger-
ald L. Neuman, "We Are the People": Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13
MICH. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992), Raskin, supra note 71, Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal
Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1092 (1977), and Paul Tiao, Note,
Non-Citizen Suffrage: An Argument Based on the Voting Rights Act and Related Law, 25
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 171 (1993); see also SIMON, supra note 83, at 348, noting the
withholding of voting rights as one way of safeguarding against the possibility of political
"invasion" by large foreign state.
125. Dummett, supra note 31, at 170.
126. See, eg., Aleinikoff, supra note 59, at 242 ("If we 'owe' more to family than to friends,
to friends more than strangers, perhaps we owe more to those who have thrown their fates in
with ours than to those who have not yet entered the country."); Charles R. Beitz, Cosmopoli-
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With the general idea of specially stringent obligations to one's de-
pendents or to those to whom one has special commitments, there need
be no quarrel.1 27 Certainly, a principled unwillingness to, for example,
rescue one's own innocent relatives first would commonly be thought pe-
culiar.128 We generally know the needs, resources, and limitations of our
compatriots better than those of distant strangers, so we may be able to
aid those near to us more effectively and at lower cost. 129 It is also possi-
ble that seeking to extend the bonds of moral loyalty too far would result
in indifference to nearby suffering."' Finally, we should be wary of
pressing too hard against even an arbitrary or apparently irrational but
widespread bias in favor of those close to us. 131
These considerations, however, do not substantially undermine the
moral case for open borders. The logic of open borders does not depend
upon some unappealing or unsustainable version of universalism or abso-
lute impartiality among persons. We need not maintain that relation-
ships, voluntary or involuntary, are of no special moral import,132 or that
cosmopolitan concerns must invariably trump narrower, more parochial
interests.
The more appropriate argument is instead, roughly, that the inter-
ests of would-be voluntary entrants into the United States cannot be dis-
missed or flatly subordinated to all legitimate interests of current United
tan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. PAIL. 591, 597 (1983) (" '[S]tates can... legitimately
favor their own populations-though not at any cost whatever to the rest of the world.'"
(quoting THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 84 (1979))); Hendrickson, supra note 31, at
223; I.M.D. Little, Ethics and International Economic Relations, in FREE MOVEMENT, supra
note 10, at 48, 51 ("fU]tility has to be weighted by social distance; charity begins at home.");
Andrew Oldenquist, Loyalties, 79 J. PHIL. 173, 182 (1982) (stating that "sometimes what ben-
efits my family obligates me more than does a greater benefit to the whole of humanity");
Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1290 (stating that aliens' claims "may be overrid-
den by claims of those already here who have contributed to their communities but who,
because of a continuing influx of immigrants, face unemployment and poverty").
127. See Philip Pettit & Robert Goodin, The Possibility of Special Duties, 16 CANADIAN J.
PHIL. 651, 652 (1986).
128. See Oldenquist, supra note 126, at 186.
129. See Sinopoli, supra note 47, at 523. See generally David Miller, The Ethical Signifi-
cance of Nationality, 98 ETHICS 647 (1988) (defending ethics of aiding compatriots over
outsiders).
130. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATION-
SHIPS 20 (1993).
131. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 48, at 217 (citing Anthony T. Kronman, Talent Pooling,
in 23 NOMOS: HUMAN RIGHTS 58, 77 (1981)). For references to sociobiological discussions of
the survival value of favoring close genetic relatives, see John H. Beckstrom, The Potential
Dangers and Benefits of Introducing Sociobiology to Lawyers, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1279 (1985).
132. For a brief discussion of the moral importance of relatedness, see R. George Wright,
Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from Quantum Mechanics, 18
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 855, 864-70 (1991).
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States citizens or residents. Thus the issue need not be thought of as
whether foreigners are in all respects and for all purposes the precise
moral equals of citizens, but again rather roughly, whether foreigners or
would-be entrants are morally entitled to at least some relevant level of
concern and respect with regard to their vital interests.
An open entry policy thus need not be incompatible with national
loyalties, patriotism, or even with national chauvinism. Nor need open
entry undermine our ability to form what the philosopher Michael
Sandel has described as identity-constitutive attachments.1 33  Most
clearly, we need not view the assets of our fellow citizens merely as re-
sources that ought to be placed at the unfettered disposal of any would-
be entrant.
Part of the resistance to open entry may stem from a misleading
dichotomy between special moral obligations owed to particular persons
bearing particular statuses and general moral obligations owed univer-
sally. 134 An open entry policy implicitly refers only to a class of persons
voluntarily desirous of and otherwise capable of entering the United
States. Obligations could be owed to such persons distinct from those
owed to all humans, all rational agents, or all moral persons. Thus we
may owe what can in a sense be called relativized or dependent obliga-
tions to all would-be entrants. We might call our obligations to such
persons particularized or special obligations, as we might call our obliga-
tions to our own family.
No plausible moral or legal rule absolutely subordinates our obliga-
tions to broad groups of people to those we bear only to a few, or abso-
lutely subordinates the distant to the near. We have admittedly become
used to the idea that in immigration cases, conservation of the public fisc
may suffice to justify refusal of entry.13 In these cases more localized
rights or interests are thought to trump broader concerns. But cases
such as Shapiro v. Thompson 136 and Plyler v. Doe137 can sensibly be read
133. See Martin, supra note 48, at 217 n.194 (citing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179 (1982)).
134. The idea of special duties, by itself, may thus be of limited value in our context. But cf
Pettit & Goodin, supra note 127, at 655 (placing substantial weight on distinction between
relativized and nonrelativized moral duties).
135. See Richard F. Hahn, Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 957, 984 & n. 184 (1982) ("The decision whether or not to admit an alien may
impinge on... the conservation of the nation's economic resources.") (citing Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)).
136. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
137. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). For general discussion, see Lichtenberg, supra note 11, and
Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of Constitu-
tional Theory: Reflections On, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITr. L. REV. 329 (1983).
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as endorsing a contrary result. At the national level, Shapiro concludes
that "a State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek
higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents gener-
ally.' 138 And while Plyler concludes that a state's denial of public educa-
tion to undocumented children actually undermines the broader public
interest, 139 the case can be read as finding no state interest sufficiently
substantial to outweigh the harm visited upon the undocumented chil-
dren, even if denying such children a public school education would tend
to preserve the public fisc.14
Thus, strength of moral obligation is not invariably a function of
proximity, spatial or cultural.'41 Martyrs, for example, may fail to pro-
vide for the welfare of their immediate relatives. If we could, with the
push of a button, permanently end torture of a large group of distant
strangers, somehow at the unavoidable cost of breaking a promise to
some friends and at some minimal cost to those friends, we might well
seem justified in doing so. More generally, it is hardly clear that promot-
ing the narrow national interest should invariably be the aim of public
policies bearing upon human rights and upon important interests of per-
sons beyond our national borders. Pointing to the real or alleged sover-
eignty of the nation-state simply begs the question. Even if we recognize
the fact of national legal sovereignty, it remains "a mystery why we
should regard the national point of view as having the kind of signifi-
cance for morality that attaches naturally to the personal point of
view.""
It may well be that positive international law remains more comfort-
able with the idea of states, as opposed to individual persons, as the bear-
ers and enforcers of rights.'43 There is, however, a strong countervailing
tendency to recognize persons as rights bearers.'" There is as well a
Presumably, the logic of Plyler could be extended to matters such as inoculations against con-
tagious diseases and related public health matters, but the precise appropriate scope of Plyler is
obviously controversial.
138. 394 U.S. at 631.
139. 457 U.S. at 230.
140. See id. at 228-30.
141. See Henry Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 ETHICS 687, 692 (1988).
142. Beitz, supra note 126, at 598.
143. RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 1-3 (1984); Scaperlanda, supra note 31, at 970 (noting that persons are to
some degree still objects, and not subjects, in international legal sphere).
144. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46
(Lewis White Beck trans., 1959) ("[R]ational beings are designated 'persons' because their
nature indicates that they are ends in themselves, i.e., things which may not be used merely as
means."); Scanlan & Kent, supra note 34, at 68; see also Schuck, supra note 21, at 2 (stating
that entitlement of rights derives not from particulars of one's time, place, or status, but from
1292 [Vol. 27:1265
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tendency to recognize that some of these rights are held simply by virtue
of one's status as a person, or at least upon grounds independent of the
arbitrary contingency of one's place of birth or native citizenship. 145 Fi-
nally, there is a tendency to recognize a-moral right, or otherwise attach
substantial moral weight, to every person's right to broad freedom of
movement. 146
Familiar legal policy recognizes in some contexts the general moral
arbitrariness of distinguishing among persons on grounds of national ori-
gin.147 The ultimate moral arbitrariness of deliberately conferring or
withholding the most substantial benefits on the basis of national origin
or place of birth in the context of immigration is less clearly estab-
lished.148 Allegations of discrimination on the arbitrary basis of national
origin arise in the context of relative shares of a more or less fixed total
ceiling of immigrants annually.149 It is less common, however, to go be-
yond disputes among groups as to their fair relative shares of an as-
one's humanity); Andrew E. Shacknove, American Duties to Refugees: Their Scope and Limit,
in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?, supra note 34, at 131, 137 ("Moral equality entails,
at the least, a recognition of the elemental integrity of each human life.").
145. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 122, at 95 ("Westerners are not entitled to deny this
[entry] right simply because they have been born on the right side of a boundary line....");
SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 68, at 135 (describing current immigration law as "based upon a
purely geographic coincidence-literally an accident of birth"); Carens, supra note 13, at 26
("[L]imiting entry to countries like Canada is a way of protecting a birthright privilege.");
Galloway, supra note 13, at 283 (discussing argument of Joseph Carens); Nickel, supra note
42, at 37 ("Human rights flow from one's humanity, not from one's citizenship status .... );
Schuck, supra note 21, at 85 (arguing that in truly liberal society, "exclusion based upon acci-
dents of birth ... would be odious"). For a broader philosophical discussion of the idea that
an apparently morally arbitrary, unchosen, undeserved characteristic such as place of birth
may or may not be a "relevant" ground of moral distinction, see, for example, R.M. HARE,
FREEDOM AND REASON 107-08, 219 (1963), and more skeptically, R.M. HARE, MORAL
THINKING 62-64 (1981).
146. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (discussing constitutional right of foreign
travel); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) ("Freedom of movement across frontiers in
either direction.., was a part of our heritage [and considered to be] basic in our scheme of
values .... "), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978);
Carens, supra note 13, at 25 ("Liberal egalitarianism entails a deep commitment to freedom of
movement as both an important liberty in itself and a prerequisite for other freedoms.");
Nickel, supra note 42, at 32 (positing human right to freedom of movement); Hillel Steiner,
Libertarianism and the Transnational Migration of People, in FREE MOVEMENT, supra note
10, at 87, 90-91 (noting libertarian opposition to general immigration restrictions beyond mor-
ally appropriate defense of value of valid contractual agreements and property rights); Whelan,
supra note 64, at 13 (noting "negative" right to freedom of immigration as both enlarging "the
sphere of individual liberty as well as being an equalizing welfare measure").
147. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1988) (barring discrim-
ination in public accommodations on, among other grounds, national origin).
148. But see supra note 145.
149. For a powerful argument discussing racist motivations underlying restrictions on entry
by Haitians asserting refugee status, see Lennox, supra note 61.
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sumedly fixed total sum of immigrants to the broader issue of the moral
arbitrariness of any restrictive entry policy.
In general, neither United States immigration law, nor the academic
criticism of the law, has come to grips with the apparent moral arbitrari-
ness of allowing many persons to undeservedly suffer absolute or relative
poverty, rather than permit them merely to enter the United States if
they are otherwise able, where others with the equally undeserved good
fortune to have been born in the United States resist even a largely pas-
sive or negative accommodation of the undeservedly less fortunate.
Of course, the issue of whether or when persons may be left, or
made, to suffer even grievous harm by virtue of circumstances for which
they cannot reasonably be held responsible is a broad one, extending well
beyond the scope of this Article.' Few writers in any context go so far
as to seek to completely eliminate all effects of all undeserved circum-
stances. Clearly, an open entry policy need not seek, for example, to
compensate all entrants into the United States so as to neutralize all
blameless suffering ever incurred by those entrants above some equitable
baseline level. In many cases voluntary entry into the United States on
any reasonable terms might well be thought by itself to outweigh one's
net accumulated undeserved misfortunes. At a minimum allowing entry
into the United States may often constitute at least a significant contribu-
tion toward redressing any such net imbalance of blameless misfortune.
An open entry policy is thus itself a broad attack on the problem of
morally arbitrary suffering and inequality. Such a policy-however justi-
fied in terms of charity, utility, liberty, equality, autonomy, and self-reali-
zation, or rights to freedom of movement-begins with Kant's
recognition that "[t]he birth is no deed of him who is born."' 5 ' Kant
speaks of "the right all men have, of demanding of others to be admitted
into their society; a right founded upon that of the common possession of
150. Some related literature appears under the rubric of "moral luck." See, e.g., THOMAS
NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS (1979); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1981); Peter
Breiner, Democratic Autonomy, Political Ethics, and Moral Luck, 17 POL. THEORY 550 (1989);
Brynmour Browne, A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck, 42 PHIL. Q. 345 (1992); Mar-
garet Urban Coyne, Moral Luck?, 19 J. VALUE INQUIRY 319 (1985); Henning Jensen, Moral-
ity and Luck, 59 PHIL. 323 (1984); A.W. Moore, A Kantian View of Moral Luck, 65 PHIL. 297,
297-98 (1990) (noting that Plato and Kant believed that "our true worth ... is something
isolable and pure which is not subject to the contingencies and vicissitudes of our empirical
surrounds but is itself, to some degree, transcendent"); Daniel Statman, Moral and Epistemic
Luck, 4 RATIO 146 (1991); Note, The Luck of the Law: Allusions to Fortuity in Legal Dis-
course, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1862, 1863 (1989) (referring to our inclination to "readily-almost
unthinkingly-accept the implicit suggestion that legal consequences, especially the imposition
of sanctions, ought not to follow from 'fortuitous' events").
151. Immanuel Kant, Essay on Theory and Practice, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 418
(Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949).
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the surface of the earth... because originally one has not a greater right
to a country than another."1 52 As a potential qualification though, Kant
suggests elsewhere that a government may encourage immigration over
popular opposition as long as "the private ownership of the land of the
natives is not diminished." ' Certainly, an open entry policy need not
involve anything like forced sales or condemning land for the benefit of
new entrants.
Ultimately, an open entry policy emphasizes not the arbitrary con-
tingencies of geopolitical natality, but the unconditional dignity of each
person.15 4 Respecting such dignity, for Kant, may require some degree
of societal sacrifice or cost. 55 An open entry policy not only promotes
human dignity in an exceptionally broad fashion, but also broadly pro-
motes what Kant takes to be the purpose of law itself-"to guarantee
each individual a maximum sphere of external freedom."'1 56
The contemporary philosopher John Rawls follows Kant in seeking
to control the influence of morally arbitrary contingencies on one's life
chances. Rawls writes that "[t]he arbitrariness of the world must be cor-
rected for by adjusting the circumstances of the initial contractual situa-
tion"'5 7 under which the basic principles of justice are to be derived.
Notoriously, though, Rawls does not attempt to consider the implica-
tions of his basic assumptions for most questions of international or
global justice or immigration.158
152. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 24 (Nicholas Murray Butler ed., 1939).
153. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE § 50, at 109 (John
Ladd trans., 1965).
154. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
848, 848-49 (1983).
155. See, e.g., Cordero, supra note 113, at 360 (discussing Kant on moral obligation of
wealthy to affirmatively assist less fortunate); see also BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
MORAL JUDGMENT (1993) (providing critical analysis of Kant's ethics); ONORA O'NEILL,
CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 138-40
(1989) (noting that without affirmative social support, humans may not be capable of dignity
of rational agency).
156. George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
533, 535 (1987).
157. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 141 (1971); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIB-
ERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE, 69 (1982) (discussing Rawls's approach in this
respect).
158. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 130, at 19 ("It seems that Rawls simply assumes that
national borders are 'given' at the outset of the discussion. He seems to be concerned about
justice within particular societies, but this is obviously an arbitrary limitation on the analy-
sis."); Singer & Singer, supra note 117, at 117 (describing Rawls as among those who "frame
their discussion in terms of how members of a community should treat each other, and over-
look the fact that the majority of our fellow human beings are not members of our commu-
nity"); cf. ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 1-2, 5, 19-20 (1991) (articulating theory of
general "equality of fortune" seeking to negate adverse effects of involuntarily incurred dimi-
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Ultimately, Rawls's analysis must come to terms with the argument
that if, for example, one's genetic limitations or inherited wealth are mor-
ally arbitrary, severe deprivations imposed solely on the basis of place of
birth are equally arbitrary. I" 9 If the logic, as opposed to the letter, of
Rawls's argument were to be extended internationally, freedom of move-
ment not merely within but between nations might be considered among
the Rawlsian basic liberties.160
Setting aside the problem of whether Rawls's deepest insights are
compatible with sovereign nation-states, Rawls's own theory would thus
seem to suggest that "[n]ationality is just one further deep contingency
(like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class)."' 161 Whether
Rawls's most basic assumptions really imply an open entry policy would
then depend upon whether such a policy advances the basic interests of
an assumed continuum of relatively disadvantaged persons and would
not overtax our abilities to comply with such a policy choice.162 Ulti-
mately, the most basic Rawlsian principles might well suggest an open
entry policy, if not more radical innovations.
Thus consistent forms of Kantianism, libertarianism, egalitarianism,
certain natural rights or natural law theories, and even Rawlsianism may
lead in the direction of open borders. Whether standard forms of utilita-
rianism tend in the same direction is unclear. The answer may depend
most fundamentally upon whether we are to aim at maximizing the wel-
fare of all persons everywhere affected by our border policy, 163 or only of
all persons currently within the boundaries of our decision-making
community. 64
nutions of resources or opportunities, subject to appropriate constraints, but not substantially
applying these basic ideas in contexts of immigration or international movement).
159. See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 64, at 10.
160. See id at 7.
161. THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 247 (1989). For further discussion, see, for
example, Pisarchik, supra note 18, at 727-31, 743-44 (arguing that Rawlsian subjects behind
Rawls's "veil of ignorance" would commit themselves to open immigration policies); Paul J.
Weithman, Natural Law, Solidarity and International Justice, in FREE MOVEMENT, supra
note 10, at 181, 194-97 (discussing possible global or international application of Rawls's "dif-
ference principle"). Note that an open entry policy need not try to capture and redistribute all
of the advantages of native United States citizenship to all those who would benefit thereby, or
even to all would-be entrants into the United States.
162. See discussion supra part II.
163. See Singer & Singer, supra note 117, at 122 (citing Victorian utilitarian Henry
Sidgwick).
164. See Jeremy Bentham, Pannomial Fragments, in A BENTHAM READER 243, 243 (Mary
Peter Mack ed., 1969). Bentham may, however, in this context be taking the welfare of the
community as sufficiently broad for his present purposes.
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Of course, a utilitarian who proposes to ignore the welfare of for-
eigners in the utilitarian calculus must face a powerful objection of arbi-
trariness. To the extent that the utilitarian wishes to maximize, over any
time frame, something like average or total utility, even discounting for
uncertainties, it is difficult to say why a unit of local pain counts for more
than a unit of foreign pain. An open entry policy, when suitably qualified
as by our discussion above, seems fully compatible with otherwise viable
and attractive forms of utilitarianism.165
IV. CONCLUSION,
The basic lines of the argument for a radical revision of United
States immigration law and policy seem clear, primarily because the rea-
soning supporting the current restrictive policies seems to have no histor-
ical or moral justification. An open entry policy may actually bring
greater benefits to United States society as a whole, and any costs im-
posed on particular segments to society can certainly be addressed
through legislative cost-shifting measures. It cannot be pretended, how-
ever, that no loose ends remain. Certainly, not all possible arguments
against an open entry policy have been ventilated.166 Nor have I sorted
out all the differences between open entry policies and policies that mod-
erately restrict entry while aiming at diversity among immigrants,167 or
the relationships between immigration policy and international wealth
redistribution, foreign aid, or terms of trade.168 Finally, I have not con-
165. See Beitz, supra note 126, at 594. Professor Beitz argues, contrary to Henry Sidg-
wick's ultimate conclusion, that utility is not clearly maximized by restricting entry for the
purported sake of community cohesion, the development of culture, and political stability.
Professor Beitz concludes that
under contemporary conditions, it is most unlikely that the value derived by their
citizens from the cohesion and order of relatively well-endowed societies is greater
than the value that could be gained by others from the redistribution of labor (or
wealth) that would be brought about by adherence to cosmopolitan policies.
Id.
166. For example, possible permanent or temporary negative and positive effects on devel-
oping countries of a further "brain drain" have not been confronted. This is mainly because
such possible effects do not seem to loom large in any authentic public debate, but also because
the evidence seems to suggest that the likely effects, particularly when U.S. earnings sent to the
entrants' native countries are considered, seem manageable in practical and moral terms. See,
e.g., DowTy, supra note 41, at 161 (stating that lesser developed countries suffer least from
"brain drain"); Hudson, supra note 32, at 202. Again, it would seem that nations benefiting
from a "brain drain" could at least partially compensate those developing nations adversely
affected.
167. While various alternative schemes might seem to improve upon current immigration
law and policy, any departure from open entry would seem to involve, prima facie, a restric-
tion morally objectionable for reasons canvassed supra part III.
168. But see GALSTON, supra note 59, at 246; supra note 166.
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sidered the extent to which the arguments raised above may or may not
apply to other societies, such as Germany, Australia, Canada, or
Japan. 169
However, an open entry policy need not have the adverse effects
many critics predict. Indeed, as shown above, legislative responses can
ameliorate any disproportionate burdens on particular segments caused
by such a policy. The current morally arbitrary restrictions on immigra-
tion are not a reasoned response to the immigration issue. An open entry
policy strips away such arbitrariness and leads to deeper and more en-
lightened debate on immigration.
No doubt there is an important difference between appreciating the
feasibility and moral logic of a legal rule of free entry, and being psycho-
logically "ready" to collectively implement such a rule in practice.170 In
this area as in others, though, the defense of legal privilege may over time
come to be recognized as ultimately unconvincing. At such a point, a
law of immigration based upon a policy of open entry would be recog-
nized as the embodiment of moral common sense.
169. See Carens, supra note 13; Joseph H. Carens, Nationalism and the Exclusion of Immi-
grants. Lessons from Australian Immigration Policy, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?,
supra note 34, at 41; Whelan, supra note 63, at 462 (referring to United States's low population
density and per capita wealth). It is far from obvious that the moral obligation the United
States bears to open its borders would entirely evaporate even if no other country took in
significant numbers of legal immigrants, or contributed financially to assist in immigration into
the United States.
170. See Nett, supra note 13, at 222-24.
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